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BOOK REVIEWS

LIVING THE AMERICAN DREAM: A REVIEW OF
JOHN HART ELY'S ON
CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND
John D. Feerick*
I was privileged to be asked by the editors of the Notre Dame Law
Review to review Professor John Hart Ely's book, On Constitutional
Ground.' I was surprised by the invitation, however, since I have not
been actively engaged in the discussions of the academy on the role of
the Supreme Court, or more precisely, what theory of constitutional
interpretation should be used by the Court in discharging its reviewing function. I confess that I initially thought the invitation was intended for one of the several constitutional law theorists on my
school's faculty. When I realized that I did not have an "out" on this
ground, I concluded that I had little choice but to take on the challenge of reviewing this book by one of the formidable constitutional
theorists of this century. If anything, I wanted to prove to myself that
Professor Ely's observation about law school deans is wrong (I'm not
sure I succeeded!): "As they approach middle age, law professors tend
to deny their dwindling creativity by becoming deans . .. or some
2

other form ofjackanapes."
Having read the book twice, and certain parts more than that, I
am glad I had the opportunity to do this review, even if it did ruin my
summer, so to speak. I put it this way because I quickly became absorbed in the subjects treated in the book and was tempted to reach
out for the other writings of the author referred to throughout the
* I acknowledge the special assistance I received from Griffin Reidy, a student at
Fordham Law School, with respect to the 1996/97 term of the Supreme Court; and
other assistance from my colleagues, Robert Cooper, Esq., Michele Falkow, Esq., and
Mr. Gregory Blackman.
1 JOHN HART ELY, ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND (1996) [hereinafter GROUND].
2 Id. at 474 n.10.
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book. I particularly recommend this book for anyone who has an interest in becoming more engaged in the tantalizing constitutional and
non-constitutional issues of our day, and certainly for anyone who follows or would like to know more aboutJohn Hart Ely. The book is an
especially good introduction for anyone seeking to be brought up to
date on issues of constitutional law. It is masterful in accomplishing
that purpose. I need to caution, however, that the book is not easy to
read or, for that matter, to review because it deals with an extraordinary number of subjects; indeed, it almost runs the gamut of an entire
law school curriculum.
Consider the subjects treated in the book's carefully written and
meticulously footnoted 507 pages: federalism, separation of powers,
freedom of expression, religious freedom, criminal procedure, racial
discrimination, substantive due process, candor, and many other subjects within each of these broad categories. More specifically, the author touches on such interesting subjects as President Clinton's useinappropriate as he sees it-of the Constitution to abolish the military's ban on gays and the President's exercise of military force in Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia; whether a President can be indicted prior to
being impeached; the importance of the "reasonable doubt standard"
despite the "unsettling outcome" of the OJ. Simpson trial in Los Angeles; the high standards that should apply to educational institutions
in the conduct of student discipline; the shortcomings of the English
Rule against contempt of court limiting what the media can publish
concerning the administration ofjustice; the French system of investigating crimes; the incompleteness of certain aspects of the Warren
Commission Report because of its dependence on the government'
then existing investigative agencies; the use of lies to gain career advancement, with particular comments on Justice Clarence Thomas
and Professor Anita Hill; and the "futility" of believing that Supreme
Court nominees can be judged "on anything other than their
politics."
I found especially well done Professor Ely's treatment of the Constitution's bill of attainder provision 3 and his analysis of the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Lovett,4 which struck down a conU.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
4 328 U.S. 303 (1946). His fascination for the bill of attainder appears to have
developed in law school and then reached its pinnade when he clerked for Chief
Justice Warren. As a clerk, he contributed to the Court's decision in United States v.
Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965), which invalidated a congressional statute based on the
bill of attainder provision. See Professor Ely's treatment of the subject in Note, The
3

Bounds of Legislative Specification:A Suggested Approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72
YA. LJ. 330 (1962).
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gressional statute prohibiting federal money from being used to pay
the salary of three individuals named in the law. I recommend for
every trial advocacy teacher, as well as other members of the academic
community, his incisive step-by-step critique of the case strategy and
development of United States v. Lovett. I also found splendid his chapters on freedom of expression and religious freedom and his treatment of reverse discrimination and affirmative action. 5 There is much
in these chapters for contemporary America, though the material included was actually written in the context of the 1960s and 1970s.
I must admit, however, to having had difficulty working through
parts of the chapter on federalism dealing with the "irrepressible" Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins and choice-of-law theorizing.7 Interestingly, he
anticipated that possibility by noting his own difficulty in finding enforceable principles of federalism. But he is not ambiguous about
where he is going because he expresses a strong preference for leaving more subjects to state regulation and for the Supreme Court
"keeping the federal government from attaining plenary legislative
power."8 I found his views on criminal procedure to be powerfully
presented with respect to the exclusionary rule and the need to reconsider the decision in Harrisv. New York,9 which allowed incriminatory
statements made without a lawyer to be admitted into evidence. His
sensitivities to the rights of criminal defendants are manifested
throughout the book. He comments on the need for judges to take
steps to ensure the integrity of trials in the face of prejudicial publicity, deplores the Supreme Court's cutback on post-conviction remeGROUND, supra note 1, at 188-97, 247-78.
6 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Professor Ely persuasively argues that when a matter is
covered by a Federal Rule, the relevant reference point in determining whether state
or federal law applies should be the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 and not Erie. His
discussion of that Act and various Supreme Court cases (including Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460 (1965)) is quite helpful. See GROUND, supra note 1, at 50-61.
7 He casts a cold eye on the view that "states have a greater interest in advancing
the interests of their own than they have in advancing the interests of outsiders."
GROUND, supra note 1, at 65. He therefore rejects a choice-of-law system based on that
premise and instead expresses a preference for the law of a common domicile or the
joint law of the domiciles of the plaintiff and defendant. SeeJohn Hart Ely, Choice of
Law and the State's Interest in ProtectingIts Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 173 (1981).

5

8

GROUND,

supra note 1, at 32-33.

9 401 U.S. 222 (1971); see GRoUND, supra note 1, at 211-30. My colleague, Professor James Kainen, joins Professor Ely in making a strong case for eliminating the
impeachment exception to Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925), finding that
"the scope of exclusionary rules ... raises meaningful normative questions about the
constitutional integrity of the criminal process and not the unavoidable evidentiary
costs of that integrity." James L. Kainen, The Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary
Rule: Policies, Principles and Politics, 44 STAN. L. R . 1301, 1372 (1992).
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dies, and urges that at the time of guilty pleas judges should make a
thorough inquiry into the facts and bargains. I was touched by his
defense of public defenders, with which I agree, and found poignant
his search for the Bay Harbor Poolroom, the site of Gideon's alleged
burglary. His latter treatment, as well as other parts of the book, suggest to me that Professor Ely has a literary talent that may one day
express itself in a prize-winning novel or two-not unlike John
Grisham's stories of the law.
His views on the subject of flag desecration were prescient given
that they preceded by fifteen years the Supreme Court's decisions in
Texas v. Johnson'° and United States v. Eichman.1 1 "Orthodoxy of
thought," he declared, "can be fostered not simply by placing unusual
restrictions on 'deviant' expression but also by granting unusual protection to expression that is officially acceptable."' 2 Compare Justice
Brennan's statement for the Court injohnson: "We are tempted to say,
in fact, that the flag's deservedly cherished place in our community
will be strengthened, not weakened, by our holding today,"' 3 and his
statement in Eichman: "Punishing desecration of the flag dilutes the
very freedom that makes this emblem so revered, and worth
revering."14
Professor Ely's postscripts and commentaries throughout the
book are worth the purchase price. In addition, the book contains a
number of interesting anecdotes which I have not seen elsewhere.
For example, he mentions a time when he recommended a female law
clerk to Chief Justice Warren, a recommendation to which the Chief
listened with restraint and then "noted (among other things) that he
worked very closely with his clerks and wondered what this might put
her (and others) in a position to accuse him of."15 Ever apologetic for
the Chief, whom he greatly admired, Professor Ely adds, "[H] e was
seventy-three years old and thus no one would listen to charges of
sexual impropriety anyhow ....
-16 He also records an encounter with
Justice Tom Clark concerning the subject of bills of attainder. Justice
Clark, who dissented in United States v. Brown,' 7 said to him while the
case was pending: "A bill of attainder! What on earth is a bill of attain10 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
11 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
12 GROUND, supra note 1, at 186.
13 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 419.
14 Eichman, 496 U.S. at 319.
15 GROUND, supra note 1, at 335.
16 Id.
17 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
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der?" 18 Professor Ely responded that he ought to know since he had
written many opinions rejecting bill of attainder claims, to which Justice Clark responded, "Yes, but remember what my opinions
said: 'It is
19
also argued that this is a bill of attainder. It is not.'
Professor Ely also shows in the course of the book that there are
limits to a law clerk's persuasive powers when it comes to a Supreme
Court Justice. This is illustrated by an excerpt from a memorandum
he wrote to Chief Justice Warren concerning United States v. Seeger,
which was decided on a theory Professor Ely "derided" in the memorandum.20 Also included is a memorandum he sent to Chief Justice
Warren concerning Griswold v. Connecticut, urging that the law in question not be invalidated on the basis of a violation of a general right of
privacy.2 1 He notes that the Chief Justice "didn't buy a word" of his
22
advice and "went along with the Court's right to privacy line."
A philosophical and humanist strand runs throughout the book,
much of which resonated with my own sense of life. Thus, in the section on lying to gain career advancement, he quotes from a letter he
sent to The New York Times in 1988: "Why can't we have a world in
which accurate pictures of people are permissible, but making mistakes is too?" 23 With respect to complaints that "nothing can work"

and that "no successful theory is possible," he observes:
The message... will be that courts needn't hang themselves up on
niceties like principled decision-making. Perhaps the new realists
find reassurance in that sea of idealistic young faces peering back
over the student benches. I find less in a truly realistic appraisal of
the ideology that is likely to issue from those faces when they've
24
grown old enough to peer over judicial benches.
18 GROUND, supra note 1, at 414 n.176.
19 Id.
20 380 U.S. 163 (1965). The case involved a provision of a federal statute which
excused training and service for a person "by reason of religious training and belief"
who was conscientiously opposed to participation in war. In the excerpt contained in
the book, Professor Ely urged that the Court not attempt to review the facts or define
religion, God, and Supreme Being. GROUND, supranote 1, at 188-89. He felt that the
law should have been invalidated because of a violation of the principle of neutrality
by favoring a particular religion over another religion or religion over non-religion.
See id.
21 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The case involved the constitutionality of a Connecticut
statute which proscribed the sale and use of drugs and medical instruments for birth
control purposes, as well as advice by physicians concerning birth control. The Court,
in finding the statute unconstitutional, grounded its decision on the Fourteenth
Amendment and the existence of a marital right of privacy.
22 GROUND, supra note 1, at 281.
23 Id. at 338.
24 Id. at 364-65.
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And as for those of us who are their teachers, what could possibly be
the joy in a life devoted to reiterating that nothing will work?
The format of the book is rather unique. It moves forward immediately without the usual preface and foreward or hint as to what is to
come, except as divined from the Table of Contents. What unfolds
are excerpts from a published book, articles, speeches, and other writings of the author, as well as excerpts from papers and memoranda he
wrote in law school and as a law clerk and government official, unpublished until now. He also includes published and unpublished letters,
congressional testimony of his, and a fan letter he sent to several
members of the Supreme Court commenting on the Court's decision
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.2 5 The book is exceptionally rich with
the author's perspectives and insights. It reflects an extraordinary
mind, a superb writer, a deep thinker, a seeker of what is right and
just, and a person with a very good sense of humor and a wonderful
compassion for the underdog and disadvantaged. In a very real sense
the book is John Hart Ely's autobiography of the past almost forty
years of his professional life. It has a "swan song" quality to it, though
I know he is far from that, given his age (younger than I), mind,
heart, and present commitments.
I suspect that each of us has a book like this within our dreams
simply as a way of recording, modestly if that is possible, what we are
most proud of in our life. In the case ofJohn Hart Ely, he has lived, in
Holmes's expression, greatly in the law and responded "philosophically" and "self-sacrificing enough" to Holmes's call for a treatment of
subjects that unifies "the entire body of law." 26 He has enjoyed a.re-

markable career: as a summer associate with Abe Fortas and the opportunity to help develop the strategy and brief in Gideon v.
Wainwright 27 service as a military policeman upon his graduation
from Yale Law School in 1963; a position on the staff of the Warren
Commission that investigated the assassination of President John F.
Kennedy; a clerkship with Chief Justice Earl Warren during the 196465 term; a year as a Fulbright Scholar at the London School of Eco25 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Although opposed to the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade
410 U.S. 113 (1973), he applauds the Casey Court for standing by that decision lest it
"weaken the Court's authority immeasurably." See GROUND, supra note 1, at 305.

26 Book Notice, 5 AM. L. REV. 340, 341 (1871) (reviewing C.G. ADDISON, THE
OF TORTS

LAW

(1870)).

27 372 U.S. 335 (1963). In that case, the Court gave expression to the rule that
persons accused of crimes are entitled to counsel in both capital and non-capital
cases. A most thoughtful memorandum of that experience is quoted from in the
book. GROUND, supra note 1, at 198-203. It is a stellar example for today's law students of legal analysis, writing, and advocacy.
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nomics; and several years as a public defender and co-founder of San
Diego Defenders, Inc. In 1968 he launched his career in academia as
an associate professor at Yale Law School. This was followed by a professorship at Harvard Law School in 1973, a brief period of service as
general counsel of the United States Department of Transportation, a
return to Harvard as the Ralph S. TylerJr. Professor of Constitutional
Law, and then selection as dean and Richard E. Lang Professor at
Stanford Law School in 1982. Since 1996, he has occupied the Richard A. Hausler Professorship at the University of Miami Law School.
John Hart Ely's influence and writings have been profound and
monumental. There can be no question that he contributed greatly
to the Supreme Court's decisions in Gideon v. Wainwright28 and United
States v. Brown,29 gave exemplary public service in San Diego and for
the United States Department of Transportation, and helped shape
the debate on constitutional theory since his 1980 book, Democracy and
Distrust: A Theory ofJudicialReview.3 0 His writings before and after this
landmark work may not have been acclaimed to the same extent, but
are significant and important benchmarks of their own, particularly
when addressing the use of motivation in constitutional interpreta32
tion,3 ' substantive due process against the backdrop of Roe v. Wade,
and the war-making powers of the Constitution.3 3 Whatever one's
point of view on the Constitution might be, Professor Ely has been in
the forefront trying to find and articulate the proper role of the
Supreme Court vis-a-vis other parts of government. He has led, educated, challenged, and provoked, earning for himself a special place
in the American legal profession.34
28" 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
29 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
30 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISRusT: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980).
31 See his seminal article,John Hart Ely, Legislative andAdministrativeMotivation in
ConstitutionalLaw, 79 YALE L. J. 1205 (1970).
32 410 U.S. 113 (1973); seeJohn Hart Ely, The Wages of Clying WofY A Comment on
Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE LJ. 920 (1973).
33 The author develops these themes fully in his book, JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND
REsPONSIBaU.
CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AN rS AFTRmATH (1993). My
colleague, Professor William Michael Treanor, draws on this book for his article, William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding and the Power to Declare War, 82 CORNELL L.
REV. 695 (1997). While agreeing with Ely's pro-Congress reading of the war-making
power, Professor Treanor adds much to the discussion by developing the proposition
that "the Founders gave Congress the power to start war because they believed that
Presidents, out of a desire for personal glory, would be too prone to war." Id. at 772.
34 For one example of his influence on a new generation of academics, see the
articles by Professor Treanor on the Takings Clause of the Constitution, in which he
urges greater deference to the legislative process, with special protections for discrete
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Because it is not possible in the limited scope of a review to cover
all of the ground contained in this enormous book, I will content myself to offer comments on only a few of the subjects, including as I go
references to perspectives of some of my colleagues on the Fordham
Law faculty. Finally, I will end by testing how well the views of John
Hart Ely have stood up in the most recent term of the United States
Supreme Court, recognizing, as Ely does, that there is an ebb and flow
in the history of the Court and in the nation of which it is a central
part. As Professor Ely notes, even if one's views fall to gain accept35
ance, the effort to do so "is enough to fill a person's heart."
I.

ELY'S GENERAL THEORY

Professor Ely suggests that the role of courts is to protect rights
that are "designated with some specificity in a constitutional document," to protect rights of political access with respect to open-ended
provisions of the Constitution such as the Ninth Amendment and the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
to ensure that the rights of minorities are "not to be treated by a set of
rules different from that which the majority has prescribed for itself."3 6 His emphasis is on access rights and equality rights, eschewing
a role for the Court in protecting "society's fundamental values" or
identifying constitutionally "unstated fundamental principles of substantivejustice." 37 He confesses scepticism that a small group, such as
the members of the Supreme Court, have the right answers to questions of public policy, or better answers than those that emerge in our
legislative bodies. While acknowledging that the deliberations of legislative bodies are far from perfect, he believes that "nonetheless our
democratic system is one that is in various ways programmed, at least
roughly, to register intensities of preference." 38 Courts, he urges,
should protect the opportunity of citizens "to participate in politics
and political decisions" by leaving the product of their decisions
alone. In doing so, he suggests, courts "enhance[ ] the autonomy" of
citizens and put them in a position where they can "behave morally." 39
He thus says to courts:
and insular minorities. William Michael Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, the Narratives of Takings, and CompensationStatutes, 38 WM. & MARYL. REv. 1151 (1997); William
Michael Treanor, The Original Understandingof the Takings Clause and the PoliticalProcess, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 782 (1995).
35 GROUND, supra note 1, at 365.
36 Id. at 7.
37 Id. at 8, 24.
38 Id. at 14.
39 I& at 9.
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Enforce those rights that have inspired sufficient popular consensus
to secure a place in the document. Enforce those rights that are
needed to let us all freely and equally register our preferences. Enforce for minorities those rights that the majority has seen fit to
guarantee for itself. Enforce all those rights with all the vigor you
can muster. But beyond that, you simply have no right in a democracy-no more than philosophers or law professors or anyone else
has-to tell the rest of us that we have made a mistake and that you
know better.4°
Ely's representation-reinforcing approach or process-perfecting
theory has provoked enormous commentary over the past almost two
decades. This commentary is admirably captured in Symposium on Democracy and Distrust: Ten Years Later41 and in my colleague Professor
James E. Fleming's thoughtful article, Constructingthe Substantive Constitution.42 As noted there, critics have charged Professor Ely with a
flight from substance.
Fleming takes issue with some of the criticism, arguing that Ely
does not flee from substantive political theory because his is "a process-perfecting theory that perfects processes in virtue of its substantive basis in a political theory of representative democracy."4 3
Fleming, however, does agree with the criticism that Professor Ely fails
to give effect to certain substantive constitutional provisions and lays
out an elaborate analysis of constitutional constructivism of his own
that he claims represents a constitution-perfecting theory. Of this
analysis, Ely notes:
James Fleming is surely right in noting that the syntax of the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the Ninth Amendment is most naturally that of substantive entitlement. In the end I don't think this
observation fatal-it does no violence to these provisions to read
them.., as protecting rights of participation in the processes and
outputs of representative government-but at least in combination
with the libertarian instincts many of us share it makes the effort
seem worth a try. 44
There is so much in this book which I find appealing. I am attached to John Ely's theory that we should defer more to our legislative bodies and discourage courts from inferring rights and values
40 Rd at 16.
41 Symposium on Democracy andDistrust: Ten Years Later, 77 VA. L. RV. 631 (1991).
42 James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEx. L. REV. 211
(1993) [hereinafter Fleming, Constructingthe Substantive Constitution];see alsoJames E.
Fleming, SecuringDeliberativeAutonomy, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1995).
43 Fleming, Constructingthe Substantive Constitution, supra note 42, at 219.
44 GROUND, supra note 1, at 307.
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where there are no clear benchmarks. And yet, I worry about such an
approach because our political world is dominated by money and
powerful special interests, and many questions important to the wellbeing and functioning of our democracy reach the Supreme Court.
The case of Brown v. Board of Education4 5 is just one such example.
Having had the privilege of chairing a commission with a mission of
exploring government integrity in my own state, I was astonished by
how entrenched the status quo is and by how resistant government is
to raising its own ethical standards in areas involving conflicts of interest regulation, campaign finance reform, ballot access laws, open
meetings, patronage prohibitions, whistle blower protections, procurement reform, and so on.46 The impact of money on our federal
system is well-documented in the daily press concerning campaign
fund raising practices of both political parties in the last presidential
election. Former Secretary of State Elihu Root observed a long time
ago that the reason for campaign finance reform is to prevent the
great aggregations of wealth from electing members of our legislative
bodies "in order to vote for the protections and advancement of their
interests as against those of the public."4 7 In the face of money in
politics, is it really safe to remove the Supreme Court as the final interpreter with respect to the open-ended provisions of the Constitution,
especially if we agree that they have substantive content? As Ely himself notes, the reflection of intensities of preferences in legislative bodies "is certainly far from perfect, money being the most obvious
distorting element," 48 leading him to question Buckley v. ValeA 9 and
related decisions of the Supreme Court.
It is noteworthy that Ely expresses strong concern about the functioning of the legislative process in his treatment of the bill of attainder provision and war-making power, and elsewhere in the book.
Indeed, in his concluding chapter he suggests that Congress has
ceased being an effective policymaking alternative to the President.
"Given Congress's vanishing act," he concludes, "perhaps it is a good
thing that.., the Supreme Court... [is] being urged.., to drop the
pretense that they shouldn't behave like legislators .... Might what's
happening... [be] our best contemporary hope of approximating
45 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
46 See John D. Feerick, Introduction to GOVERNMENT ETHICS REFORM FOR THE
1990's: THE COLLECTED REPORTS OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT INTErRIry 1 (Bruce A. Green ed., 1991).

47 New York State Comm'n on Gov't Integrity, Restoring the Public Trust: A
Blueprintfor Government Integrity, 18 FoRDAM URB. L.J. 173, 173 (1990).
48 GROUND, supranote 1, at 13-14.

49 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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the sort of balanced system the framers envisioned?" 50 Interestingly,
Professor Ely's argument for a more limited role for the Court in dealing with open-ended provisions of the Constitution contrasts with the
broad view he would have the Court take of general expressions in the
specific subject matter provisions of the Constitution involving bills of
attainder, the freedoms of expression and religion, and in areas involving the rights of the criminally accused.
In a world of partisan politics and a clash of conflicting interests,
a case can be made that the judicially created (perhaps even the work
of a law clerk!) Caroline Productsfootnote, 5 1 which has so heavily influenced the thinking of Ely, should not be seen as the full compass of
the Supreme Court's role in judicial review. Thus, an important interest is served by the debate based on interpretivism, originalism, protecting fundamental rights, and reinforcing representative
democracy. 52 I have little to add to the ongoing dialogue except to
note the reflections with which I left college in 1958 as a result of my
"study" of the Constitution as an undergraduate political science major. I was taught that Marbuiy v. Madison stood for the proposition
50 GROUND, supranote 1, at 354 (citations omitted). The importance of "balance"
in constructing a theory of the Constitution was ably articulated by my colleague,
Professor Martin S. Flaherty, in Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105
YALE LJ. 1725 (1996).
51 In United States v. CarolineProducts Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938),Justice Stone setup
the following framework for a more rigorous judicial review of legislative action:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments, which
are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the
Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny
under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are
most other types of legislation.
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of
statutes directed at a particular religious or national or racial minorities:
whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
Id. at 152 n.4 (citations omitted). See the criticism of an approach based on "discrete
and insular minorities" voiced by a dissenting Justice Rehnquist in Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 656-57 (1973) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
52 See generally Symposium, Fidelity in Constitutional Theory: Editor's Forward, 65
FoRDHAm L. REv. 1247 (1997).
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that it was the duty of the Court "to say what the law is,"5 3 that McCulloch v. Maryland5 4 made clear the importance of the Court's reviewing
function in terms of civil peace, and that the Constitution was a "living, evolving" charter, as evidenced by its history since 1789. Indeed, I
even find a hint of the latter in Professor Ely's discussion of the freedom of expression, where, in speaking of the reviewing function of
appellate judges, he states:
I hope we have left far behind the notion that 'The Law' is a list of
rules deduced in vacuo from some set of celestial principles to

which the courts have access, and therefore the bringing to bear of
empirical data, and arguments as to what practical effects the adoption of a given rule would have, are somehow out of order.... Law
that does not respond to social needs cannot, nor should it, long
remain law. 55

Maybe, in the final analysis, the least dangerous branch of government offers the best hope of securing our rights and liberties. On the
other hand, Ely is surely right to insist that in construing the Constitution, the Court should speak with clarity in its pronouncements and
prod our legislative bodies to do their job in dealing with the great
moral issues of the day.
53 5 U.s. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Marshall's opinion for the Court noted the
specialness and primacy of a written constitution, requiring courts to apply, expound,
and interpret it as "the very essence ofjudicial duty." He added:
Could it be the intention of those who gave this power, to say that in using it,
the constitution should not be looked into? ...This is too extravagent to be
maintained. In some cases, then, the constitution must be looked into by
the judges. And if they can open it at all, what part of it are they forbidden
to read or to obey?
Id. at 179.
54 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 315 (1819). There Marshall opined about the meaning of a
written Constitution and added:
Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines should be marked,
its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose
those objects, be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves. That
this idea was entertained by the framers of the American constitution, is not
only to be inferred from the nature of the instrument, but from the language. Why else were some of the limitations, found in the 9th section of
the 1st article, introduced? It is also, in some degree, warranted, by their
having omitted to use any restrictive term which might prevent its receiving
a fair and just interpretation. In considering this question, then, we must
never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding.
Id. at 407.
55 GROUND, supra note 1, at 159.
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INDICTABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT

Among the many interesting documents contained in the book is
a letter, which Professor Ely did not send to The New York Times in
1973, taking issue with a brief filed by Solicitor General Robert Bork
which argued that the President "could not be indicted prior to being
impeached."5 6 As I vividly recall, those were difficult days, and the
prospect of President Nixon being impeached or indicted was very
much in the air. It seemed to me at the time that there was a stampede going on that possibly was overlooking the fact that the President had his rights. 57 Hence, I am not sure that General Bork's
reference was wholly out of line and without historical support. It
bears noting that the framers of the Constitution rejected the idea of
the judiciary trying cases of impeachment. Gouverneur Morris said in
the Constitutional Convention debates of September 4, 1787, that "[a ]
conclusive reason for making the Senate instead of the Supreme
Court the Judge of impeachments, was that the latter was to try the
President after the trial of the impeachment. "5 8 In the state ratifying
debates, James Iredell said that impeachment was designed "to bring
great offenders to punishment" and noted that an official who is impeached might be liable for common law punishment if the offense
"be punishable by that law."5 9 Moreover, Article I, Section 3 of the
Constitution states that the judgment on impeachment "shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold
and enjoy any Office of Honor, Trust, or Profit under the United
States: but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject
to Indictment, Trial, Judgment, and Punishment, according to Law."
To be sure, what is impeachable conduct and therefore within
the zone of these provisions is far from dear.60 What is clear, I suggest, is that non-indictable conduct which is not connected with the
exercise of official power is beyond the scope of the impeachment
power. Immunity for the President in connection with such conduct,
as Professor Ely remarks, finds no support in the debates of the Constitutional Convention.
56

Id. at 140-41.

57 See the reviewer's articles, John D. Feerick, President's 'Right' in Impeachment
Probe, N.Y. L.J., April 1, 1974, at 1, and John D. Feerick, The Hastings Impeachment
Aquitta N.Y. LJ., May 28, 1974, at 1.
58 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 500 (Max Farrand ed.,
rev. ed. Yale Univ. Press 1937)
59

4JoNATHAN ELLIOT,

THE

DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE

ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

113-14 (2d ed. 1941)

60 SeeJohn D. Feerick, ImpeachingFederaljudges:A Study of the ConstitutionalProvisions, 39 FORDHAM L. REv. 1 (1970).
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CAMpus DISCIPLINARY RuLEs

I thank Professor Ely for including in his book a letter which he
sent to the Stanford Campus Report in 1991 and a memorandum he
sent to members of Yale University in 1971 bearing on the subject of
student disciplinary investigations and proceedings. He reflects in
these writings great sensitivity to the rights and concerns of students,
correctly noting that disciplinary proceedings "sometimes . . . can
shape the entire course of a person's life." 61 It has long seemed to me

that not enough attention is paid to this subject within our educational institutions from the standpoint of what is the right balance
between the rights of students and the needs of a community to assure
integrity. I worry at times that institutions may ignore their own responsibilities and procedures in the process of finding and pinning
guilt on an accused student and fail to take advantage of the opportunity to treat an issue from an educational or pedagogical perspective.
It is deplorable, in my opinion, for an institution to accuse a student
and then to rush the student into a poorly crafted disciplinary proceeding without any meaningful assistance. A student thus chastized
will face extreme difficulty in gaining access to postgraduate school,
the professions, and government employment. Professor Ely renders
an important service by reminding us that the Bill of Rights needs to
have a life within our academic institutions.
IV.

THE

1996/1997

SUPREME COURT TERM

Near the very end of the book, Professor Ely observes: "If the test
of success is whether one's theories will gain general acceptance over
time... then of course the odds are almost certain that each of us will
fail." He adds and concludes: "Perhaps we never will get the boulder
to the top of the mountain. But the struggle itself is enough to fill a
person's heart."6 2 John Ely must, indeed, be pleased by the recent
term of the Supreme Court, because his points of view in a number of
areas were reflected in decisions of the Court.63 Most conspicuous
61

GROUND,

supra note 1, at 232.

62 GROUND, supra note 1, at 363-65.
63 See, for example, Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997), in
which the Court affirmed a decision declining to accept a proposed class of present
and prospective claimants. It stated that Rule 23 "must be interpreted with fidelity to
the Rules Enabling Act" and cautioned that rules of procedure "'shall not abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right.'" Id. at 2252, 2244. In Reno v. American Civil
Liberties Union, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997), the Court invalidated provisions of a federal
statute which prohibited the dissemination of sexually offensive material, emphasizing that even offensive speech is covered by the First Amendment and may not be
suppressed. In M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996), the Court made clear that an
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among the decisions was the play given to principles of federalism and
separation of powers, subjects close to his heart. Some of the more
interesting cases in terms of his writings are noted below.
A.

Substantive Due Process

In Washington v. Glucksberg,6 4 the Court held that the due process
guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment does not protect a right to
assisted suicide. It acknowledged that it should be cautious in expanding substantive due process, because the concept is open-ended
and there exist relatively few guideposts. It said that by declaring a
right or liberty interest, it removes an issue from public debate and
legislative action, running the risk of inappropriately reflecting the
policy preferences of individual Court justices. 65 In identifying a
right, said the Court, it must evaluate whether it is "'deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition' ... and 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if
they were sacrificed.' "66 The Court added that although many rights
protected under due process implicate these issues of personal autonomy, not all personal decisions are similarly protected because personal autonomy is not a protected right in itself.67 The Court,
therefore, reversed the Ninth Circuit and upheld a Washington state
statute prohibiting assisted suicide. It concluded: "Throughout the
Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate
about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our holding permits this debate to continue, as it should in a
democratic society."68 Concurring, Justice Stevens stated "that there is
indigent parent was entitled to access to an appeal, through a transcript of relevant
proceedings, in a civil case involving the loss of parental rights. In so doing, it struck
down a Mississippi law which conditioned the right of appeal on prepayment of record fees in the amount of approximately $2,400. And, in Chandlerv.Miller, 117 S. Ct.
1295 (1997), the Court found unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment (as
incorporated into the Fourteenth) a state law which required candidates for public
office to pass a drug test. The Court said that the test "diminished 'personal privacy'
for a symbol's sake." Id. at 1305. The Court added: "Our precedents establish that
the proferred special need for drug testing must be substantial-important enough to
override the individual's acknowledged privacy interest, sufficiently vital to suppress
the Fourth Amendment's normal requirement of individualized suspicion." RL at
1303.
64 117 S. CL 2258 (1997).
65 See id. at 2267-68.
66 Id. at 2268 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)
and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
67 See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2271.
68 Id. at 2275.
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also room for further debate about the limits that the Constitution
places on the power of the States to punish the practice." 69
B. Federalism
In Printz v. United States,70 the Court invalidated the Brady Act
because it required individual state officials to regulate the sale of
guns. The Court stated that federal laws imposing regulatory schemes
upon states is not supported by the structure of the Constitution, history, and the Court's jurisprudence. It stated that such an imposition
violates the concept of federalism and thereby erodes a significant
structural protection of liberty by which the Constitution prevents an
excessive accumulation of power in any one branch. The Court also
said that such impositions violate the concept of separation of powers
by denying the President his responsibility to supervise the faithful
execution of the laws and represent a further accumulation of power
by Congress unto itself, risking the road to tyranny against which the
Constitution was designed to guard. Thus, while Congress can itself
regulate the sale of guns via its commerce clause powers, the Court
said that it cannot force a regulatory scheme upon state officials. Said
Justice Scalia: "When a 'La[w] . . . for carrying into Execution' the
Commerce Clause violates the principle of state sovereignty reflected
in the various constitutional provisions[,] .. .it is not.

.

. 'properfor

carrying into Execution the Commerce Clause,' and is thus, in the
words of The Federalist, 'merely [an] ac[t] of usurpation' which 'deserve [s] to be treated as such.'"71 In so finding, the Court responded
to a plea contained in On ConstitutionalGround that there should be
some limits placed on the commerce power in the interest of federalism. Ely noted that "the root explanation of runaway federal
power.., is the seeming illimitabiltiy of the commerce power, for
which no one has been able to define a principled cutoff, at least not
72
one with serious teeth."
C. PresidentialImmunity
Clinton v. Jones,73

In
the Court found that a sitting President does
not have immunity from a private action for civil damages. In the
course of its decision, the Court said that presidential immunity applies only to the performance of official functions and that such litiga69
70
71
72
73

Id. at 2304.
117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
Id. at 2379 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 204 (Alexander Hamilton)).
GROUND, supra note 1,at 38.
117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997).
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tion, as vexing as it may be, does not rise to the level of a separation of
powers risk. 74 The outcome in this highly-publicized case accords
with the views expressed by Ely in a 1973 memorandum to Archibald
Cox on the legality of calling President Nixon before a grand jury, to
wit: "The 'convention' that the president cannot be called before a
grand jury, let alone that he is generally immune to the judicial process, seems very faint indeed."75 He adds in a footnote in the book
with respect to the then-pending Clinton v. Jones lawsuit "We've come
far enough toward the sort of regal presidency the framers abhorred
without effectively immunizing behavior of the sort alleged ... ."76
D. Religious Freedom
Three cases involving the religion clauses of the Constitution are
noteworthy because of the element of federalism expressed by the
outcomes in the cases. In City of Boerne v. Flores,77 the Court invalidated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, which was
passed in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith.7 8 In Smith, the Court
upheld an Oregon statute prohibiting the use of peyote, among other
narcotics, in the face of a free exercise challenge by Native Americans.
In its Boerne decision, the Court said that it alone had the power to
declare the constitutional ight to free exercise of religion and that
Congress does not have the power to alter the substantive meaning of
the Constitution's guarantee in this area. Such power would enable
legislative majorities to evade the amendment process and place legislative acts on the same level as constitutional provisions. The Court
concluded that there was no need for so sweeping an act as that
passed by Congress imposing such burdens upon states.
In Timmons v. Twin CitiesArea New Party,79 the Court upheld a law
of Minnesota prohibiting fusion candidacies through the vehicle of
multi-party nominees. Although First and Fourteenth Amendment associational rights were implicated, the Court found the burdens imposed by the state law to be of a lesser variety and not sufficient when
balanced against the regulatory interests of the state. The Court
stated: "States certainly have an interest in protecting the integrity,
74 Id. at 1645-50.

75 GROUND, supra note 1, at 138.
76
77
78
79

Id. at 415 n.183.
117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
117 S. Ct. 1364 (1997).
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fairness, and efficiency of their ballots and election processes as
means for electing public officials." 8 0
In Agostini v. Felton,8 1 the Court found that providing services on
parochial premises under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Act
of 1965 did not constitute an excessive entanglement with religion.
The Court said that it had rejected the notion in earlier cases that a
public employee on sectarian premises is presumed to inculcate reli82
gion in her work and symbolizes a union between church and state.
It noted that the public aid in question reached sectarian institutions
as a result of private decisions and that the services were provided
based on neutral criteria. Quite clearly, the Supreme Court has
adopted the theory and language of neutrality suggested by Professor
Ely with respect to its treatment of the religion clauses.88
E. Reverse Discrimination
In Abrams v. Johnson,8 4 the Supreme Court held that race cannot
be a predominant factor in drawing district lines favorable to minorities. The Court upheld a plan formulated by the district court which
contained only one majority-minority district, instead of two as preferred by the state legislature, because creating a second would have
amounted to subordinating the state's traditional districting policies
and considering race predominately. Given his thoughtful treatment
of the subject of reverse discrimination, Professor Ely would not have
been surprised by the outcome in this case, although he has suggested
a different approach in reviewing racial classifications that advantage
minorities:
When the group that controls the decision making process classifies
so as to advantage a minority and disadvantage itself, the reasons for
being unusually suspicious, and, consequently, employing a stringent brand of review, are lacking. A white majority is unlikely to
disadvantage itself for reasons of racial prejudice; nor is it likely to
be tempted either to underestimate the needs and deserts of whites
relative to those of others, or to overestimate the costs of devising an
80 Id. at 1373.
81 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
82 See id. at 2010.
83 In On Constitutional Ground, Professor Ely notes that "[t]here is no constitutional bar to helping or hindering religious persons or groups along with otherwise
similarly situated persons or groups. Deviation from neutrality occurs only when religion or a religion is singled out for advancement or inhibition." GROUND, supranote
1, at 195.
84 117 S. Ct. 1925 (1997).
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alternative classification that would extend to certain whites the ad85
vantages generally extended to blacks.
In contrast to what the Court did in Abrams, Ely has observed:
"Measures that favor racial minorities pose a difficult moral question
that should, by one method or the other, be left to the states. There is
nothing suspicious about a majority's discriminating against itself,
though we must never relent in our vigilance lest something masquer86
ading as that should in fact be something else."
In the coming term of the Supreme Court87 the issue of affirmative action will present itself, and Professor Ely's views on that subject
will have an important test. On this subject, he has written: "[I]f we
are to have any hope of defeating racial prejudice we will, at least for a
time, have to take race into account for some purposes"; and:
[T]he question is whether the negative educative effects of using
racial criteria to overcome centuries of discrimination are so inevitable, and so threatening, as to outweigh the good that such programs
may accomplish. It is a difficult question, but the basis for an affirmative answer can hardly be secure enough to support an abso88
lute declaration of constitutional impermissibility.

V.

CONCLUSION

I am grateful for the opportunity to review this book. It has renewed my passion for constitutional law and for delving into constitutional theory. But more than that it- has made me appreciate more
fully one of America's greatest constitutionalists and an outstanding
member of the legal profession. John Hart Ely can be rightly proud of
the role he has played as a lawyer and teacher and of his own contributions to making "the American Dream more broadly accessible than
it had ever been before."8 9 I applaud him for this volume and wish
him continued heavy lifting in the law. I know that there. are many
issues of contemporary interest on which he has not yet published a
view. Given the esteem in which he is held by all who know him and
GROUND, supra note 1, at 272.
86 GROUND, supra note 1, at 275; see also James Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of
Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CH. L. REv. 723 (1974). For a most thoughtful
treatment of increasing the representation of minorities in the Senate, see the article
by my colleague, Professor Terry Smith, Rediscovering the Sovereignty of the People: The
Casefor Senate Districts,75 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1996).
87 Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Gir. 1996), cert. granted, 65
U.S.L.W. 3354, 3849, 3860 (U.S.June 27, 1997) (No. 96-679).
88 GROUND, supra note 1, at 273, 274.
89 Id. (speaking of Chief Justice Earl Warren).
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by others like me from afar, I await with interest his future writings, in
whatever form.

FREEDOM IS A THEME ONLY
Stephenf Safranek*

The Theme is Freedom is M. Stanton Evans' recent attempt to "set
straight accepted" but "mistaken notions about our country, its institutions, and its freedoms."' Evans wants to show how freedom was developed in this country-based upon the principles developed
throughout history. This is the task Evans sets for himself, and the
book successfully accomplishes this task. The Theme is Freedom is replete with interesting historical information and a useful critique of
many current views of how the people of the United States have been
made free. Although Evans does not clearly set forth the means by
which he will accomplish his task, his approach is generally straightforward. Essentially, Evans sets forth the historical development of
freedom as it relates to the United States and our peculiar institutions.
This approach begins with a discussion of what freedom means and
how the idea of freedom developed. Then, in what are the central
chapters of the book, Evans shows how the freedoms developed in the
two millennia before the founding of America led to the specific incarnation of freedom found in America. Finally, in his concluding
three chapters, he discusses the way in which modern society threatens that freedom-because of its view of the establishment clause and
economic freedom-and how freedom can be recovered.
Evans looks at the historical documents, draws reasonable conclusions from them, and sees the history of the development of freedom
and this country in a way certain to annoy some. However, whether or
not one agrees with Evans, one can read this book and have a firm
understanding of why conservatives are unhappy with the way things
are in the United States. In short, The Theme is Freedom is a useful
source for a readable view of principled conservatism.
This book serves as a nice contrast to books such as George Will's
Statecraft as Soulcraft2 and Barry Goldwater's The Conscience of a Con-

servative.3 Unlike such works, Evans' book is not concerned with devel* Associate Professor of Law, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law.
1 M. STANTON EvANs, THE THEME Is FREEDOM, at xi (1994).
2 GEORGE F. WILL, STATECRAFr As SouLcRAFT: WHAT GovERNMENT DoES (1983).
3 BARRY M. GOLDWATER, THE CONSCIENCE OF A CONSERVATIVE (1975).
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oping the philosophy of conservatism, although Evans does defend it.
Instead, he explains historically how freedom developed in the United
States. This historical review will be of interest to many because of its
ease of reading.4 However, this strength is also the book's weakness.
Although Evans makes a good historical argument, he is on less solid
ground when he tries to explain how freedom was or is being lost and
how it can be rekindled. It appears that Evans thinks that religion is
the key to re-founding this country and that the religion of the Old
and New Testaments is the religion that can reform society. Yet, he
never shows why or how this reform can happen, despite his obvious
discontent with the current state of government. Is America, like England, destined to become a country where "freedom" is slowly replaced with coercion?
I.

OVERVIEW

The first chapter of this book begins with the dramatic collapse of
the Soviet Union and its lesson for the United States. In "The Liberal
History Lesson,"5 Evans notes that the Soviet Union was the archetype
of central planning-there was no limit on the power of the central
government. In contrast, the tradition of the United States, the clear
winner of the Cold War, "is, precisely, the idea of imposing limits on
governmental power, in the interests of protecting freedom." 6 This is
the key recurring theme in this book. For Evans, the key means by
which freedom can be ensured is by limiting governmental power.
Evans recognizes that the common response to conservativism is
to challenge the pairing of libertarian economics with social conservatism. He faces this issue squarely and claims that the libertarian economics he values is dependent upon religious values and traditional
practice for its survival. 7 He thinks that one can be both an economic
libertarian and a social conservative. Indeed, he argues in this book
that the two thousand year tradition of Western Civilization was based
upon religion and that the religion of the West played a decisive role
in creating the free society founded in 1787.
Evans argues for this premise for the next three hundred pages.
He recognizes that how one views the founding of this country and
how one views the individual will shape one's belief as to the kind of
4 For a much more thoughtful and complicated review of conservatism that begins with Edmund Burke, the key text is RussEL KIx, TIE CONSERVATIVE MIND: FROM
BuRKE TO ELIOT (7th ed. 1986).
5 EvANs, supra note 1, at 3-21.
6 Id. at 14.
7 See id.
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country "America is, or should be."8 He attempts to prove that true
conservatives embrace free institutions-churches as well as businesses-and that economic liberalism arose out of the churches. It
was not freeborn from the mouth of Adam Smith.
Evans chooses what he hopes is a non-controversial view of freedom, which he views quite simply as "the absence of coercion." 9 Such
freedom, he thinks, has its genesis in Europe and is clearly focused on
the individual whose liberty is "fenced off by the equal liberty of
others." 10 Although Evans regularly uses the Puritans as a key example of the freedom that developed in America, he regularly notes that
the special form of freedom found in this country was dependent
upon a history of freedom that grew out of the Middle Ages as found
in the writings of Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas."
One of the first misconceptions that Evans seeks to debunk is the
view that Christianity is a repressive religion and therefore is antagonistic to freedom. Among the criticisms expressed against religion is
that it is superstitious, and that those who espouse a strong religious
view are especially oppressive. The critics of religion cite the Enlightenment as the key historical time period for modern society that led
to the growth of democracy in Europe and eventually to the founding
of the United States. 12 Evans wants to counter this notion. He faces a
difficult and uphill task, especially in today's climate where the "Religious Right" and anyone who has religious beliefs is seen as a threat to
freedom. Certainly, Evans does not and cannot counter the fact that
it is religious conservatives who appear to be those most interested in
creating laws that will rein in what are seen as societal excesses such as
teenage pregnancy, crime, abortion, and divorce. Instead of addressing this problem directly, Evans notes that the United States was born
from a history of religious people. How or why religions now seek to
use state power to rein in perceived excesses is not dealt with in this
work.
Instead, Evans begins with the first principles of modern society
that arose from the darkness of the ancient world. One of the most
interesting points that he makes in his chapter titled "The Age of Despots" 13 is that many think that tolerance is the same as relativism, that
8 Md'at 15.
9 Id. at 23.
10 Id. at 24.
11

See id. at 30-32; see generallyTHOMAS AQUINAS, TREATISE ON LAW (Gateway ed.

Regnery Publishing, Inc. 1996) (1947).
12 See EvANs, supra note 1, at 39-40.
13 Id. at 39-56.
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is, that one value is as good as another. 14 Unfortunately, this issue is
quickly considered and summarily answered. Evans is correct in noting that relativism as a principle is like any other first principle that
cannot be proven. If relativism is the key principle for free societies,
which Evans thinks it is not, then slavery and every other evil are incapable of being effectively reviewed. For relativists, a society that allows
or embraces slavery or any other form of barbarism is no better or
worse than a society that rejects such a state of affairs. This is patently
wrong. If, as is universally thought, freedom is better than slavery, we
need to understand why and how this key principle came to be
recognized.
Evans paints a clear picture of those societies and thinkers who
have failed to recognize the value of individual freedom. In modem
times, the gulag as well as the forces of Hitler's Nazis provide a clear
picture of those who thought that the individual had value only in
light of the state. These societies, now mostly discredited, were able to
repress the individual because they were built upon a view that the
15
state was the absolute.
Christianity, contrary to modem views, is the key historical religion that allowed the development of the individual. As Evans notes,
Christianity saw that each person is endowed with infinite value. 16
Precisely because of this value, no person can be seen as a mere part
or cog in the state. Instead, the state is seen in relationship to the
individual. Evans notes that Christian societies hold fast to absolute
values of right and wrong precisely because each person is given a real
and absolute value. When relativism takes hold, the necessary consequence is authoritarianism. This is because someone or something replaces each human person as an absolute value. This newfound value
may be Nietzsche's "superman"' 7 or it may be the state. But in either
instance, the consequence is the repression of the individual.
The theory of natural law, which holds that each individual has a
God-given value and that there are unwritten laws under which every
person, even kings and princes, must act, is disregarded today. In its
place are a variety of views including "natural rights." These views
have generally built upon the natural law tradition, but have jettisoned certain aspects of it, usually the religion. Evans uses his chap-:
ter entitled "From Champagne to Ditch Water" 18 to disabuse the
14 See id. at 42-43.
15 See id. at 50.
16
17
18

See id. at 309; see also MARTIN LUTHER
See EvANs, supra note 1, at 53.
Id. at 57-74.

KING,JR.,
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reader of the value of replacements, noting that people usually want
to preserve civil liberties or some other aspect of human liberty without the baggage of natural law.
Evans critiques the "natural rights" developed by followers of
Locke. Without naming them, Evans takes clear aim at the followers
of Levi Strauss, 19 the famous political philosopher from the University
of Chicago, whose followers have had a tremendous impact on the
resurgent Republican party and who are often known as neo-conservatives in contrast to the paleo- or traditional conservatives. The problem with the supposed logic of a Locke or the utilitarianism of a
Bentham is that the positions of these philosophers rely 'for their
presuppositions upon what is evident to their interlocutors. What is
evident are the values handed down for centuries in a religious tradition. Because of their detachment from history, the principles of a
Locke or a Bentham can end in the assertion of power over the individual because both utilitarianism and the social contract presuppose
moral citizens. Bentham and Locke also presuppose the idea that the
people can regulate their lives.
One of the key principles of freedom is the people's ability to
regulate their lives as agreed.20 In one of the most startling aspects of
this book, Evans asserts that we no longer have such a law, that is, a
Constitution. 2 1 The reason such a change has come about is because
members of Congress never ask whether or not an action is constitutional, but ask instead, whether or not it is good or bad. This same
reflex has infected the judiciary. What was once a highly conservative
document, Evans argues, has been made into a meaningless text.
With a Constitution that grows over time and with a view of congressional power that allows laws for the general welfare, the basic division
and separation of powers under law no longer can be held to exist.
Today, the United States is a country whose powers are unlimited. Evans uses chapters five through fourteen to show that this result is not a
natural outgrowth of what had been built. He uses his final chapters
to show some of the consequences of this development.

19 See LEo STRAuss, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY (1970). This book provides a
comprehensive outline of Strauss' views on natural rights.
20 SeeJom CouRTNE MuRRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS 18 (1960).
21 EvANs, supra note 1, at 67.
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THE CONSERVATIVE TRADITION

A.

The Background

"The Uses of Tradition" 22 is the key chapter wherein Evans
sketches the three key components of the conservative tradition of the
United States. The American experience grew out of three interrelated principles: 1) limits on the power of kings; 2) the rule of law;
and 3) the consensual development of the law.23 These three key
components of the American notion of freedom were distilled by the
Founders out of the medieval and English traditions. Interestingly,
Evans notes that just as the Americans were embracing these three
notions, the English themselves were abandoning them.
One of the key components of the consensual English tradition
was the common law. 24 Here Evans notes how the great legal expositor of the common law tradition, Sir Edmund Coke, had described
the common law as the accumulated wisdom of many years and many
persons. The value of the common law was that it provided a check
upon the powers of the state. Although the common law was sometimes haphazard and intricate, these very weaknesses worked as a deterrent to those seeking to usurp the freedoms of others.
Unfortunately, Evans does not here explore how the great developer of the common law tradition, England, so easily gave itself over
25
If
to the power of Parliament as the ultimate arbiter of the law.

indeed the English tradition was the basis of our founding, why was it
that the English so easily lost their way? Why is it that the current
direction of the United States and England, both of which Evans
would argue are not under a constitution, is not, in fact, a continuation of the tradition? Evans' attack on the problem and the concerns
for unlimited power are both well taken. However, he fails to show
why or how the American founding was able to avoid or overcome the
problems that overcame the English common law tradition or how
America, seemingly having lost its way, can recover what has been lost.
In this chapter, though, Evans makes one of his most interesting
historical points. He argues that the American revolution was essentially a conservative movement. The revolutionaries were trying to
preserve the tradition that was lost in England. It is here again that
Evans looks at the common law and notes how this common law tradi22
23

Id. at 75-94.
Id. at 78.
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25 Keir chronicles the incredible instability that took place in England for the 75
years before 1714. See id. at 289.
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tion was a perfect foundation for free markets. In his view, the common law is a slow development of law over time that by its movement
and indirection is essentially the same as the free market. Through
the slow development of law, persons accede to changes which are
made as needed to deal with the changing environment. The common law is the custom of the land: the most perfect law. It further
inculcates spontaneous development of practices and institutions
based upon the assent of many through the ages. The order of the
common law, then, like the order of free markets, is such that it is
designed from the bottom up and is therefore more perfect and ordered than if done in any other fashion.2 6 Evans recognizes that the
English did eventually lose this tradition. The demise of the tradition
in England and the retention of it by the early Americans was due to
the absolute values found in religion. It is religion that serves as the
source of absolute values, and it is religion that ultimately created the
specifically American experience.
Evans discusses how certain religious beliefs led to the development of the American experiment. One of the key beliefs of the
Christian tradition is the notion of man's sinful nature. This "pessimistic" view of human nature is the subject of the chapter titled "If
Men Were Angels." 27 While some claim that this pessimistic view of
human nature leads to the demand of religious conservatives for an
authoritarian government, Evans notes that conservatives imbibed
with Burkean notions know that the sinfulness of the ruled also encompasses that of the rulers. Therefore, government needs to be
fenced in with religion, custom, morality, and law. Certainly, if virtuous people govern, government is better. However, given the state of
mankind, especially from a Puritan perspective, power was to be carefully controlled. The Puritan and American experience, unlike that of
the French Revolution, did not view govermment by the people as perfect 28 Instead, it recognized that the very nature of power is corrupting and that all power must be circumscribed by a variety of tools.
This was one of the key worries of the Anti-Federalists as they argued
against the exercise of power by the new federal government.2 9 Cer26 See EvANs, supra note 1, at 89-90.
27 Id. at 95-112.
28 See EDMUND BuRxE, REFLECTrIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANcE 51-53 (heirloom ed. 1965) (1872). Burke notes that when, as is usually the case, the leaders became motivated by "sinister ambition," it led to the problems in France because of the
composition of the government. Id. at 53.
29 The entire FederalistPapersis an argument about the power of the federal and
state governments. Madison explicitly notes how the government was limited in its
powers. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 240-46 (James Madison) (heirloom ed. 1966).
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tainly, such a government was to be run by the same sort of persons
who ran the state governments. Therefore, it could be argued that it
was no more dangerous than were the state governments. However,
the Anti-Federalists argued, and prevailed on this point, that the
power of the federal government was so great that it needed to be
controlled s0
The value of the American system was not that it created some
sort of virtuous Greek state. Instead, it provided order within which
people could go about their business. Although such a system of government could not prevent unvirtuous action, it could prevent unethical persons from wielding unlimited power over the citizens. In
addition, the Founders clearly saw that such a government could only
be established and thrive if the people were virtuous. If such virtues
were lacking, it was not within the capabilities of the federal government, or any government, to create such virtue.
Although religious values seem well founded in this country and
Evans thinks that the average American is a Christian, he believes that
a new paganism is emerging in this country. One of the pervasive
ideas throughout history has been materialism. Under this view of
reality everything is determined by material wealth. Material conditions determine who will succeed and who will fail in life. All poverty,
all crime, and all change can be explained in material terms. Consequently, every problem can be solved if enough material resources are
used. Thus, we often hear the refrain: We can place a man on the
moon, but we cannot eliminate poverty. It seems that if we can do the
former, we must be able to do the latter.
Evans worries about this approach to reality. First, if we are essentially materialists, then the state may be tempted to use material resources-one of the few ways in which the state can really project
power-to solve the problems created by material shortages. If we
have poverty, create government programs to stamp out poverty. In
addition, if material reality is all that exists, then there is no room for
spiritual freedom. Consequently, materialism will become the all encompassing religion ruling society.
The American society of the twentieth century is closer to the
pagans than it may think. For Evans, the green movement is essentially a pagan movement with mother earth as the new goddess. In
addition, he notes that many of the most divisive moral issues facing
See 1 THE COMPLETE

ANTI-FEDERALIST 30 (HerbertJ. Storing ed., 1981); see also
84, at 510-20 (Alexander Hamilton) (heirloom ed. 1966).
Although the Anti-Federalists prevailed, the federal government has taken on virtually
unlimited powers.
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this country today such as abortion and homosexuality, pit the neopagans against Christians. In such cases, the so called neo-pagans
often cite the history of Greece and Rome as examples wherein abortion, homosexuality, and euthanasia were practiced.
These views are today often inculcated in students under the
guise of the need for a nonjudgmental society. Yet, Evans thinks that
these positions are essentially religious in nature; that is, they are not
subject to dispute but rely upon certain accepted first principles.
These values can be and are taught in schools, yet the Bible is not
because such education would violate the separation of church and
state. Thus, neo-paganism is making serious inroads into modem life.
B.

The ChristianMedieval Tradition

Given this background, Evans begins his historical argument in
favor of the American experience and its aspirations by considering
the course of human freedom. As he stated at the outset, the key issue
that he wants to explain and defend is that of human freedom.31
This, for Evans, is the key political issue. In considering the rise of
such a notion, Evans notes that it is of relatively recent origin.
In the ancient world, to which we so often look, the notion of
human freedom was lacking. In that world, the ruler had unlimited
power, both temporal and spiritual. In addition, the world was full of
bloodthirsty gods who ruled by will. Slavery and infanticide were the
norm. Each human being was seen as part of the state and subservient to it.
The Christian era changed this world view. Under Christianity,
nature is ordered by God, and the fact that each person is totally dependent upon God and will be judged on the last day makes each of
them far more similar than different. Indeed, Christianity created a
worldview never before seen.
Christians held that not only is every common person under the
law, but so too is the king.3 2 Moreover, it was not the role of the king
to be the interpreter of the law. In the Christian world, the king was
not only under the law, but the exercise of his power could be criticized by those who claimed to understand what his duty was under the
31
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the ancient tradition, which he defends, relies upon Aristotle who thought that the
government should make men good. In fact, this is the "central purpose of any genuine political community." Id. at 22.
32 See EvANs, supra note 1, at 145. For an excellent discussion of this idea, see
ERNST H. KANTORowicz, THE KING'S Two BODIES (1957).
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law.3 3 This placed a far greater degree of restriction on the king than
had been common in the ancient world. Additionally, each person is
equally a child of God with the king. It is understandable why in this
world slavery was eventually eliminated, whereas it had only grown
and flourished during the long history of both the Greek and Roman
worlds.
This understanding of the relationship between persons led quite
naturally to the world that was established in medieval christendom.
Contrary to popular understanding, the medieval world was rich in
freedom as understood by Evans. Grinding poverty may have existed.
Yet, under medieval notions, the relationships between lords and vassals and the common people were full of obligations. These obligations were mutual insofar as the failure of one side to fulfill its duty
resulted in the other side being freed of its mutual obligation. Evans
gladly notes that the single most famous document limiting the power
of the king arises in this age, the age of Magna Carta.
Strangely, we do not think of the Magna Carta as a medieval document. Indeed, it is not commonly referred to as such, and this reviewer has never seen it referred to as a typical medieval document.
Yet Evans treats it as such. He claims that the "foremost political concept of the Middle Ages was constitutionalism."3 4 The Magna Carta
was a type of this age. It was a document created by Catholic clergy
and feudal barons setting forth what the king could and could not do.
The king, as a result of the Magna Carta, explicitly acknowledged that
he must act pursuant to law and upon consent. This was a result never
seen in the ancient world. For Evans, the Magna Carta shows the
greatness of the medieval world that is so often misunderstood and
nearly always referred to in a negative light.
The Magna Carta was created and thrived in a world where the
social compact was well established. Locke did not create this view,
but instead merely captured what was well understood at his time. Evans notes that the entire view of relationships in the medieval world
was one where obligations were mutual. Of special importance in this
era was the obligation involving taxes. The Magna Carta and the subsequent conflicts between Parliament and the crown emphasize that
taxes were only to be given in exchange. No general power of taxa35
tion existed in such a world.
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. C. Pre-FoundingAmerica
In his chapter entitled "The Dissidence of Dissent,"3 6 Evans describes the America of the pre-revolutionary period. He notes how
the settlers-large numbers of whom were Puritans-had created
what Evans thinks was the best government. Having fled a country
that had refused to recognize their freedom, these early settlers developed a theory of constitutionalism: "power wielded by consent, annual
elections with an expansive franchise,... local autonomies and a Bill
of Rights." 37 The Puritans were the persons most responsible for this
development. Evans argues that their "covenantal theology" was critical to the formation of America as we know it.
Puritans maintained that the people were to choose their leaders.
Consequently, they had a strong view of the role each individual
would play in the church and in the polity. Evans states that twenty
thousand Puritans fled England to America between 1629 and 1640.38
This is astonishing. The people who came were usually led by educated ministers. In virtually every instance, these people formed the
social contract of which Locke would later write. These contracts allowed voting on a scale unseen in any known history.
The Puritans had a long time to graft onto America. We often
forget that approximately one hundred and fifty years separate the
founding of the American colonies and the Revolutionary War. During this time the colonists, Evans argues, were actually more traditional than the English themselves. Moreover, the revolution was
itself a well ordered conservative movement. In support of this thesis,
Evans notes that the soldiers who had fired on the civilians in the so
called "Boston Massacre" were either found not guilty (six) or let off
with light sentences (two) by the supposedly outraged colonists.3 9
This occurred shortly before the war. Certainly such an outcome contrasts sharply with the untold carnage that accompanied the French
Revolution.
The long time frame during which the colonists grafted themselves onto the North American land gave the colonists certain expectations. One of the long standing traditions in the colonies was that of
self-taxation. This tradition had never been challenged until shortly
before the Revolutionary War. The British, in part hungry to pay war
debts, but even hungrier to assert their power, began to hold that Parliament could do what it willed, including taxing the colonists. This
36
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attempt to exercise unlimited power, rather than the taxes themselves,
inevitably led to the war. It was the Americans who, in accord with
hundreds of years of English tradition, held that they could not be
taxed by a Parliament which did not represent them.
The Declaration of Independence was a logical outgrowth of the
situation in which the colonists found themselves. This document is
of the same genre as the Magna Carta. The colonists spent two-thirds
of the document reciting the abuses committed by George III. The
most famous passage of the Declaration, "we hold these truths," was
based upon the principles that had undergirded the colonists since
they set foot on American shores: that God has created men equal,
and that government is based upon consent. The importance of God
in that document cannot fairly be ignored. These were clearly a religious people.
Having seized their independence, the Americans now had to
fashion a new government. The genius of the Constitution was twofold. First, it was a written document, thereby meant to provide a
source of stability and clarity that would otherwise be lacking. Second, it depended upon two types of checks-those between the various branches of government and those between the states and the
federal government. 40 It was impossible for the Founders to foresee
what would transpire with regard to this document during the ensuing
two hundred years.
III.

MODERN PROBLEMS

Having shown the extent to which the American enterprise was
built on historical and actual notions of limited government, Evans
concludes his book by looking at where we are today. He takes up two
issues, religion and economics, and shows how the modern world has
so thoroughly destroyed the notions that were developed for hun41
dreds of years and clearly established in the Constitution.
First, Evans looks at the "establishment of religion" problem in
America. He notes that in 1775, no fewer than nine colonies had established religions. 42 South Carolina's 1787 constitution stated that
the Christian Protestant religion shall be deemed the established religion of the state. 43 Despite these historical facts, the Supreme Court
has incorporated the establishment clause vis-a-vis the states so that
establishment problems face all governmental bodies. Clearly, Evans
40

Id- at 261-64.
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is correct that the Supreme Court had to stretch to do so. However,
he does not set forth what can be done now. What can or would happen if the states were allowed to establish religion as they wanted?
Given the tremendous power of the purse exercised by government,
the role of the state in squelching or influencing religion is far more
expansive than could ever had been imagined in 1787. What can be
done?
Similarly, Evans critiques the loss of economic liberty in the
United States. Economic liberty is essential for a free society, and in
Evans' view, it is recommended by religious precepts. 44 Economic
freedom is indeed the single most common way in which the citizen
expresses himself or herself. It is as worker, not as writer, that most
individuals in a society express themselves. Yet, the liberty of the press
is given far more extensive protection than that of economic liberty.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although Evans extensively critiques the state of affairs in which
Americans find themselves, he provides few easy solutions in The
Theme Is Freedom, when he provides any solutions at all. Evans argues
that the problem America faces is religious. 45 Until a recovery of religious faith occurs, freedom cannot be created. 46 In addition, Evans
argues that we need to curb federal power and develop a rule of law.47
In this regard, Evans makes a most telling point about the state of
affairs in America-today the key issue in politics is not on the limits
of power but on who will wield that power.48 Unless and until that
view of power, and the demise of religion, is changed, the theme may
be freedom, but its development into a full story will be unfulfilled.

44 Id. at 290.
45 Id. at 323.
46 See also ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TowARD GOMORRAH 336-39 (1996). Bork
sees a robust religious community as one of the key antidotes to the current decline in
American life. Id. at 336.
47 EvANs, supra note 1, at 323.
48 Id.
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